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In Capital and Ideology, Thomas Piketty returns to questions of historical inequality, not merely to fill in the gaps 
in the earlier, widely circulated and impactful Capital in the 21st Century, but to undertake a far more ambitious 
and nuanced project. Critics (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018; Moeller, 2016) pointed out that in the previous book, 
Piketty's consideration of the role of high concentrations wealth on inequality focused largely on a handful of 
relatively wealthy countries (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan). More importantly, 
it did not consider the political and economic relationships, forged by European colonization and the trans- Atlantic 
slave trade that helped to create lasting inequalities in wealth, status, education, and life expectancy around the 
globe. These oversights corresponded to significant methodological gaps, in which inequalities defined by social 
status and identity, including gender, race, and caste, were largely left out of considerations that centered around 
economic and material disparities. Yet, these different forms of inequalities are intimately connected, as gender 
wage gaps and racial wealth gaps in different parts of the world attest.
Capital and Ideology sets out to rectify both sets of criticisms and in doing so, offers a refreshingly large lens 
on the historical creation, stabilization, and reformation of systems of inequality. The book covers an impressively 
varied set of social and historical topics, from the creation of feudal regimes of property in 11th century France, 
to the exploitation of slave labor in plantation economies in the Americas and the stabilization of caste hierarchies 
under colonial rule in India.
Despite its incredible scope, range, and ambition, Capital and Ideology once again brings into sharp focus the great 
economic transformations that took place in the middle of the 20th century, contrasting these with rising inequality 
in our times. According to Piketty (2020, p. 20), the “most worrisome structural changes facing us today [include] the 
revival of inequality nearly everywhere since the 1980s.” As his work here and elsewhere explains, the extreme mate-
rial and social disparities of the Gilded Age were dramatically rolled back by war, global depression, and the creation of 
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modern welfare systems, contributing to a “Great Levelling” of economic inequalities in many countries. Starting in the 
late 1970s however, the central features of social democratic governance (including progressive taxation and financial 
market regulation) start to unravel. We can see the results all around us, evidenced by the dramatic rise of the top 
decile's share of national income across Europe, North America, India, China, and Brazil (OECD, 2011; Piketty, 2020).
What accounts for the limits and failures of mid- century welfarist experiments? Capital and Ideology examines 
the creation of what Piketty terms “ownership societies” that valued and maintained high concentrations of private 
wealth, along with their brief reversal in the mid- 20th century (aided by new instruments of social democracy, in-
cluding the nationalization of key infrastructures and services, public education, health and pension reforms, and 
progressive taxation). Despite the “undeniable successes” of these social democratic states (largely speaking here 
of Western Europe and to a lesser extent the United States), such schemes “began to run into trouble in the 1980s” 
(Piketty, 2020, p. 486). Why? Piketty points to three causes: a) the failure to implement more ambitious power- 
sharing and public ownership within firms, b) the inability to provide truly equal educational structures and opportu-
nities, and c) the failure, politically as well as institutionally, to protect and expand the progressive taxation of wealth.
Yet as historians, we remain puzzled. Are these causes of failure? They might perhaps be read as parts of a cau-
tionary tale, which point concerned readers and policymakers toward instruments for redressing current trends in 
expanding inequalities. But as arguments about historical causation, they are scant and give us few clues as to how 
to read the long 20th century— its successes along with its many tragedies. According to Piketty, these diagnosed 
failings of mid- century welfare strategies point mostly to the limited ambitions of leaders, scholars, and political 
thinkers. Except for a few cited exceptions— namely Sweden and Germany— he argues that policies for public owner-
ship, education, and taxation simply did not go far enough and were not supported, ideologically, by strong enough 
visions of economic and social inclusion. Gradually, older ideologies of ownership societies erode reformist progress, 
allowing for capital flight, privatization of public services, and a steep drop in tax rates for top income brackets.
Yet the period in question, starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, also gave rise to incredibly important 
battles for greater social and economic inclusion, whether these were movements for racial, sexual, and gender 
rights in Europe and North America, anti- dictatorship struggles in Latin America, opposition to communist au-
thoritarianism in the Soviet bloc, or against the marginalization of minority ethnic communities in Asia and Africa. 
From the rise of Second Wave feminism, the civil rights and the Black power movement in the United States to the 
Biafran War, workers’ strikes in Chile, the anti- apartheid struggle in South Africa and political opposition to Indira 
Gandhi's Emergency in India— the last decades of the 20th century gave voice and visibility to countless battles for 
racial and gender justice and for economic inclusion.
These struggles (and the crises of that period) were not simply arguments in favor of more ambitious welfare 
schemes. They were also indictments of the blind spots and structural limitations of the forms that welfare and 
social democratic inclusion had taken during the first decades after the war. This inclusion, we argue, following 
the work of critics such as Kathi Weeks and Nancy Fraser, made “work” the primary grounds for recognition in 
the welfare state (Fraser, 2013; Weeks, 2011). On the one hand, the idea of the worker as citizen helped to knit 
together postwar societies, creating consent, and support for progressive taxation and public welfare provisions 
(Mau, 2004). On the other hand, this productivist emphasis (Maier, 1977) valued the labor of some while dis-
counting the labor of others, and served as a pre- condition for erecting new (racialized and gendered) barriers for 
women, immigrants, ethnic minorities, people of color and gay and transgender people, and their inclusion in the 
opportunities created by postwar social democracies. Recognizing these relationships allows us to more construc-
tively revisit the turn point of the 1970s and to remap historical trends in rising inequality (Wirsching et al., 2011).
This article will be divided into three parts. After a brief overview of Piketty's broader scholarly project in 
Capital and Ideology, we next turn to an examination of welfare policies in the United States and Western Europe to 
understand how the new social, political, and economic configurations of the postwar period effectively excluded 
important groups and constituencies who helped to build the prosperity of the period. We demonstrate how the 
model of the Western welfare state (which Piketty both critiques and seeks to expand) was built on a series of 
internal contradictions and exclusion that need to be critically examined, in order to understand what this model 
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might offer in terms of contemporary policy and where its structural gains should to be relativized and reframed. 
The next section will examine this same period from a more global perspective. We argue that the history of the 
emergence of welfare states must place postwar reconstruction and redistribution in Europe and North America 
within broader global patterns of exploitation, extraction, and distribution. During this period, many parts of the 
Global South and the newly decolonized world tried to imagine alternative configurations, from Bandung to the 
NIEO, for organizing systems of ownership, industry, economic opportunity, and prosperity, while critiquing the 
unequal systems of power, control, and structural protections that perpetuated First World wealth and privilege.
In doing so, we wish to highlight two arguments. First, it is important to see that the eventual unraveling of 
welfare structures was not simply a product of internal failures or the lack for more robust participatory schemes. 
Rather, the success of neoliberal economic ideologies and transformations depended, in part, on the contradic-
tions and structural exclusions of welfarism. The unraveling of welfare protections were not simply the result 
of ideological and class contests, but also due to the structural limits of welfarism and the global exhaustion of 
models that could not adequately contend with growing demands for greater civil and political rights and social 
recognition. This brings us to our second argument. As we lay out below, it is important to recognize that every 
system and discursive frame for organizing and legitimating inclusion is also a system of exclusion. The ideological 
terms of inclusion create important boundaries, establishing new arguments about which members of society 
deserve protection and which do not “yet” qualify. In order to understand the failures of the past, and to avoid 
simple triumphalist visions of equality, we must carefully attend to who is excluded, how, and under what terms, 
even as we aspire to build more inclusive societies in the future.
1  | C APITAL AND IDEOLOGY
Capital and Ideology is an expansive project, covering nearly 600 years of global history. And it is not simply the 
historical range and geographical focus that have shifted, in comparison to his earlier work. In this new approach, 
Piketty gives a far more expansive account of how inequality regimes are created, maintained, and challenged over 
time. In comparison to many recent broad- scale accounts of global inequality (Milanović, 2016; Scheidel, 2018), 
Piketty's book does not rely on the role of catastrophes, the pressures of resource scarcity, or the operation of 
market allocation to explain how and why hierarchies are formed or transformed. Instead, he is clear in saying that 
inequalities are created by social and political choices. They are made through human agency, rather than being 
dictated by external pressures.
The new book lies also in marked contrast to Piketty's Capital in the 21st Century (2014). In that earlier work, he 
outlined various “laws” of capitalist accumulation, exploring what appeared to be inherent, market driven tenden-
cies toward high levels of wealth accumulation in the top strata of societies. Policies, according to this framing, are 
constantly doing battle with an inherent propensity toward high rates of return on capital and the concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a few. In the latest book, Piketty makes a rather different argument, in which inequality 
is shaped not by mechanical forces of accumulation, but by human commitments, policies, understandings, and 
organization. Simply put, inequality is something that societies make. It is here that Piketty turns to ideology— as 
a set of beliefs and practices that are negotiated and subject to change— as the central driver and shaper of what 
he calls “inequality regimes.”
While the idea of ideology is thinly formulated (lacking the materialist underpinnings that this term rests upon 
in the theories of Marx, Lukács or the Frankfurt School), it nevertheless does some important conceptual and 
historical work and moves us away from the notion that levels of inequality are simply dictated by the stage of a 
society's development. In many popular accounts of inequality's rise and fall, history is deployed merely as back-
ground, helping to display an obvious, natural progression across time from more hierarchical societies (marked by 
feudal obligations, slavery, and indenture) to democratic ones (in which citizens enjoy not only political equality 
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but also greater social security, education, and labor market access). This book gives us a much more complicated 
account of the past, one in which history is dictated not by scarcity but by moral and political choices at every step.
The turn to ideology allows for a more complicated, less linear account of “progress.” It underwrites, for in-
stance, a more serious and considered account of recent reversals in economic inequality, as the product of dif-
ferent sets of historical commitments— and the emergence of a new kind of market liberalism focused on the 
individualization of opportunities and risk. Rather than the patterned logic of Kuznets curves (or Kuznets waves in 
the analysis of Milanović), here Piketty argues that there is nothing inevitable about progress. Trends in inequality 
(measured largely in terms of material distributions) can reverse course or undergo radical revision, sometimes in 
very short time frames. Piketty's book, through an expansive long durée account, ends on a hopeful note, despite 
the trend of rising economic inequality in recent decades. If political and moral frameworks, choices, and com-
mitments shape inequality regimes, we can choose different paths forward, guided in part by historical moments 
during which economic inequalities were successfully reversed, when shared institutions, structures, and policies 
prevailed.
Yet, despite its scope and new historical emphasis, the argument in important ways remains tied to concerns 
and understandings that marked the first book. Both emphasize the role of property as an economic, fiscal, moral, 
and social organizing force that comes to have a deep and enduring impact in shaping inequality regimes, past, and 
present. Similarly, both books share a liberal optimism, arguing that social science, mass education, power- sharing, 
and democratic inclusion can diminish high levels of inequality. While calling our attention to the extremely seri-
ous social and political consequences of unchecked economic accumulation, Piketty remains confident that rising 
inequality is a problem to which solutions can (and have) been fashioned. We wish to look more carefully and 
critically at these claims, to understand what this account of inequality regimes leaves out of the analysis.
In Capital and Ideology, the central organizing thread is property and the proprietarian logics that mark vari-
ous inequality regimes across time. In Western Europe, war and economic depression led to the dismantling of 
accumulated wealth and privilege, and saw better redistribution of income and wealth than previous centuries. 
In the process, millions gained access to greater security, better education, and new economic opportunities. In 
Capital in the 21st Century, Piketty's central concern— the tendency of private capital to accumulate in the hands of 
a few— mapped onto a dynamic that was social and political as well as economic. If r > g, the security of those who 
own capital expands over time, potentially creating a permanent rentier class, while undermining the economic 
position and social standing of people who rely on labor alone to provide for themselves and their families.
This central struggle, between labor and capital, sets up a profound tension that runs through the new book as 
well. Proprietarian logics, we are told, are responsible for many of the worst forms of political abuse and economic 
exploitation, from aristocratic regimes of early modern Europe to the rise of the trans- Atlantic slave trade and the 
development of modern industrialization in the West. Property unfairly advantaged certain groups of people over 
others and served as an ideological lynchpin that defined fairness and inclusion (predicated on ownership rather 
than citizenship).
This critique, which sees property as a foundational element in modern inequality regimes, offers a fruitful 
conceptual terrain for understanding, for instance, why nations such as France, Britain, and the United States 
failed to offer any kind of reparations to freed former slaves in the 19th century. The right to compensation for 
lost property trumped the violated human rights of former slaves. However, this focus on proprietarian ideologies 
also valorizes, in an uncritical way, the one moment in this historical account where the relationship to property 
is rolled back— the postwar period and the successes of Euro- American welfare states. It does not spend much 
time trying to investigate structural flaws of these states, which replaced the logic of proprietarian power with a 
new emphasis on worker- citizens (who were also frequently framed as White, male bread winners). The next two 
sections of this article examine closely the ways in which emerging postwar welfare states excluded large groups 
of people, while simultaneously relying on their unpaid or undervalued work. The first section will look at the 
exclusionary structures of postwar welfare, especially in the West, while the following section will examine how 
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the long shadows of colonial rule and decolonization, which called into question how the postwar global system 
organized and ideologically framed inclusion.
2  | THE LIMITS OF THE WORKER-  CITIZEN MODEL A S A FOUNDATION 
FOR THE MODERN WELFARE STATE
The creation of welfare states in Western Europe and North America helped to share the risks and rewards of 
postwar recovery, and reduced economic inequality. Yet, many were not adequately included within its provisions. 
Piketty shows in Capital and Ideology that these schemes often did not go far enough; with the cited exceptions 
of Sweden and Germany, few countries created robust power and equity sharing institutions to help distribute 
corporate rewards or prevent capital flight. The provisions of welfare safety nets were inadequate in other ways, 
failing to cover all members of societies equally. In North American and Europe, women, racial minorities, guest 
workers, and immigrants either did not benefit to the same extent, or were actively excluded from education, 
healthcare, housing support, government- backed financial services, and pensions schemes. Instead of locating our 
critique solely in the limited ambitions of the welfare model, we want to critique the model itself, arguing that the 
worker- citizen model not only tied rights to productivity but also privileged some forms of labor over many others.
Historians and other scholars have argued whether such provisions were exclusionary by nature or whether 
existing forms of discrimination and prejudices prevented the extension of more universal coverage. As Ira 
Katznelson has shown with the GI Bill, such arguments set up a false dichotomy. They obscure the historical pro-
cess by which support for the welfare state, starting with the New Deal, was fashioned in the United States. The 
GI Bill (The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944) offered educational grants and healthcare to veterans, and 
appeared in the process to provide equal support (at least on paper) for minority servicemen. However, legislative 
approval for these measures was secured among Southern segregationists by actively accommodating Jim Crow 
laws. As a consequence, while Black veterans received de jure the same benefits as their White counterparts, de 
facto fewer colleges, lending institutions and doctors served them, and as a result, Black servicemen and veterans 
received far fewer benefits (Katznelson, 2005). As Katznelson explains, the democratic coalitions required for 
altering existing tax structures and extending government programs were also committed to preserving the color 
line.
We see similar issues in other welfare states, in which minorities, immigrants, and women received less sup-
port and uplift, despite the emergence throughout this period of better collective bargaining, education, and 
healthcare, and more distributive social spending. The legacies of these issues can be seen even today through 
racial and minority attainment gaps in health, wealth, and education many countries, including the United States, 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany. In example after example, these programs failed to aid minorities and 
other vulnerable segments of the population to the same extent as they did better- situated groups in society.
If postwar provisions, while creating vast new institutions and networks of support, did not lift everyone one 
up equally, it is also important to look at the actual terms through which inequality was framed in different parts 
of the world. It is easy to imagine that the terms of inclusion were limited or constrained by older structures of ex-
clusions or historical prejudices, but the issues are often more complicated than vestigial social divisions. Here, we 
want to draw attention to the ways that different welfare regimes “saw” potential beneficiaries (in the language of 
James Scott's classic text Seeing Like a State (1998)), often drawing sharp lines between workers and dependents, 
between citizens and non- citizens, between the formal economic and the informal sector, and between traditional 
industries and modern ones.
One way that postwar welfare states organized inclusion in the welfare state was through the construction 
of the idea of basic needs. Scientists, policymakers, and experts developed new ways of calculating standards 
of need, especially around food consumption. The emergence of the calorie as a global unit of measurement in 
social policy was crucial for expanding welfare systems around the globe. It helped to set poverty lines, expand 
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school lunch and free school meals, fix minimum wages, and create measurable targets for alleviating poverty 
(Allen, 2013; Levine, 2008; Simmons, 2015). Such “vital minimums” as Dana Simmons (2015) explains, intersected 
with a range of mid- century welfare provisions, from wage setting to food security. On the one hand, they helped 
to extend the social security floor to millions of people who had never received such governmental support be-
fore. On the other hand, they shifted attention toward raising the economic floor and improving living standards, 
away from a deliberate focus on the top end of the social spectrum and issues of inequality and redistribution.
At the same time, as Victoria de Grazia (2006) has shown in her work on the history of postwar reconstruction, 
such minimum thresholds were part of a process by which citizens were reframed as consumers, whose welfare 
could be measured in access to goods and services (whether that was housing, food, education, or consumer du-
rables). As a result, some of the other ways of marking social inclusion (through citizenship, voting, collaborative 
decision making and collective bargaining) were sidelined, in exchange for consumption- driven metrics of prog-
ress. This remains true, even when the poverty measures moved away from absolute quantities to relative ones, 
using cost of living and floating monetary standards rather than calories to set poverty lines and other important 
thresholds (Ravallion, 1998). Piketty's book highlights the importance of structures of social democracy, but in 
order to understand why and how democratic and power- sharing structures remained limited in the postwar era, 
one must look carefully at the terms in which inclusion and equality were being historically framed during this 
period (Conway, 2020).
If welfare systems largely measured their own provisions through a consumerist lens (in order to ensure ad-
equate levels of food, housing, healthcare, and education), the right to welfare was, throughout the latter half of 
the 20th century, couched in the language of work and labor productivity. This is partly anchored to the rising 
prominence, starting in the interwar period, of national income (and later GDP) as the most important metric for 
gauging the size and health of the economy. As Adam Tooze (1998) has argued in the context of interwar Germany, 
the ability to imagine and account for the national economy (as a definable entity) helped to frame 20th century 
nationalism more broadly. After World War II, the ability to measure, represent, and intervene in rates of economic 
growth fed into narratives of postwar reconstruction, resurgence, and anti- colonial emancipation in different na-
tions and helped to structure political accounts of the success or failure of government policies (Mitchell, 2014).
The technique of national income accounting was largely developed during the interwar period as a way of 
measuring labor productivity (Speich, 2011). According to Simon Kuznets, one of the primary architects of the 
method, income was merely a tool for gauging the efficiency of the labor force. Unfortunately, using taxable 
income as the primary unit of measurement failed to account for large numbers of unwaged care workers (mostly 
women) and casual laborers whose work was essential, but whose contributions were not captured by official re-
cords. This was a problem that Kuznets (1941) himself acknowledged and one that he worried about. Indeed, this 
continues to pose problems for contemporary economics, since efforts at wage equalization might fall short when 
the labor of many people falls outside the boundaries of tax revenue data.
In the process, GDP growth not only helped to measure but also redefined the boundaries of the national 
economy. Welfare safety nets were fashioned around new “productivist” rhetorics, and inclusion was framed 
in terms of protecting and developing formal labor capacity, assisting the households of laborers, or cushioning 
those who were unable to work in the formal economy. Such inclusion, while quite expansive in comparison to the 
turn of the century (as Piketty ably demonstrates) was also predicated on structural and necessary exclusions, on 
making some forms of labor visible while suppressing the value of other forms.
Following from the work of Esping- Andersen, many theorists of Western welfare states, have argued that 
programs for social security, pensions, and public benefits help to decommodify labor (Esping- Andersen, 1990; 
Holden, 2003; Orloff, 1996). They buffer workers from the sharper edges of market- dependent labor compen-
sation by setting minimum wage floors, protected collective bargaining, and mitigating risks associated with in-
jury, illness, and old age. But as feminist economists and social theorists have pointed out, even robust welfare 
schemes impact the lives of women very differently than their male counterparts (O’Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1993). 
In a society such as Sweden, with extensive childcare and paid parental leave benefits, the welfare state actually 
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underwrites the commodification of women's labor, making it possible for women to enter the formal labor force 
in larger numbers. In Germany, which provides less state- paid child benefits and family leave than Sweden, the 
state in effect keeps more women out of the workplace (Jordan, 2006; Naumann, 2005). In the process, the rise 
of income as a primary metric for thinking about and planning for inclusion in the welfare safety net has had pro-
found consequences for how societies value and remunerate the highly gendered labor of social care and social 
reproduction (Weeks, 2011).
The architecture of the welfare state, starting in the 1950s in the West was based on a culturally specific, 
heteronormative understanding of the nuclear family. This often meant that policymakers and national planners 
struggled to understand and include households that operated under different logics, including large joint fam-
ilies or ones in which migratory labor and remittances were central to household budgets. These frameworks 
also discriminated against single women, male caregivers, and those outside heteronormative relationships. As 
many historians have documented, the postwar period in Europe and North America pushed women, who had 
taken important roles outside the home during wartime, out of the job market (Anderson, 1981; Chafe, 1992; 
Hartmann, 1982; Meyerowitz, 1994). And, while such exclusions affected middle class women more than their 
working class counterparts (since the later continued to work in large numbers outside of household obligations), 
the care labor of women across the class spectrum remained invisible and undervalued.
The idea of the nuclear household, centered around a male income- earning head and a female caregiver helped 
to structure pension and child benefits for widows and families. The well known U.S. case Weinberger versus 
Wiesenfeld, for instance, (fought and won by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in front of the Supreme Court) demonstrated 
the ways in which benefits were differentiated by sex, thereby denying widowers who were primary caregivers 
the same level of support received by widows (Williams, 2013). These measures, as Ginsburg (1977) and other 
feminist legal scholars have shown, discriminated against women even as they appeared to give them additional 
benefits, because they were based on structures that both assumed and perpetuated the lack of financial inde-
pendence for women, treating adult women as financial wards of men. Women in the United States were unable 
to independently open bank accounts or take out loans for housing or education without male family members 
countersigning until the 1970s (Kessler- Harris, 2003). Same- sex couples could not receive pension benefits or 
other important protections available to opposite sex partners.
A further exclusion, or at least unequal inclusion, created by the postwar economic “miracle” is connected to 
migration. The postwar boom of the 1950– 1970s generated a thirst for workers that was plugged by large- scale 
movements of people. If initially this was drawn from populations displaced by the war it soon expanded to include 
millions of migrants from colonies, former colonies and from Europe's “peripheries” to the south and southeast. 
By 1973, the peak of this period of immigration, roughly 12% of Germany's labor force and 10% of France's was 
foreign born (Tomka, 2013, p. 38). Migration to Europe has been said to have contributed to overall growth by 
exerting a moderating pressure on wages— releasing capital for reinvestment in reconstruction and productivity 
growth (Eichengreen, 2008, p. 87; Vonyó, 2008). While this may seem paradoxical in terms of its inequality- 
reducing potential, it could be seen as part of the confluence of factors that facilitated the kinds of neo- corporatist 
compromise Piketty and others see as critical in facilitating the “Great Levelling” (Fisher- Post, 2020; Maier, 1977; 
Piketty, 2020, pp. 495– 504).
Many migrants to Europe's richer and fastest growing nations arrived unofficially, tolerated if not encouraged 
by labor- hungry industries. In 1968, the French immigration office estimated over 80% of foreign immigrants in 
the country had arrived clandestinely (Castles et al., 2013, p. 106). While many would regularize their situation, it is 
worth asking how far their work in the informal economy registered in the kind of tax- based distribution statistics 
available to Piketty, and whether the “Great Levelling” might look different if they did. That immigration benefited 
Europe in this period to some extent seems uncontroversial. Estimating the effects of emigration on the countries 
that supplied Europe's expanding labor force, however, is a more complex matter. Over the past five decades de-
bates have swung between pessimism and optimism, at times seeing emigration as a valve releasing demographic 
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pressures and a source of capital through remittances, others as a brain drain and a break on growth capacities of 
migrant sending countries (Castles et al., 2013, pp. 69– 77).
Postwar migration is also related to patterns of inequality in Europe in less direct, but interesting, ways. How 
different welfare regimes across Europe support women's formal work (for instance through childcare provision, 
parental leave provision, or pay discrimination policies) has a significant effect on gender inequality. As mentioned 
above, since the 1960s Scandinavian welfare regimes have explicitly supported women's labor force participation 
through childcare and parental leave provision; but it is seldom acknowledged that the to choice to enact such 
policies was closely connected to the issue of immigration. In the mid- 1960s, labor shortages and the opposition 
of Swedish labor unions to increased migration prompted a swathe of reforms supporting married women's em-
ployment. In contrast, in Switzerland and Germany, where more hierarchical views of gender prevailed and unions 
were comparatively weaker, the decision to import migrant labor was at least in part taken to preserve women's 
traditional roles (Afonso, 2019; Lewis & Åstrom, 1992).
In the case of the United States, the postwar demand for labor was met mostly internally, with migration from 
the poorer agricultural south. The “Second Great Migration” featured particularly African Americans seeking job 
opportunities in cities and in the booming industrial north and escaping the segregation of the Jim Crow south. 
Yet, the gains made by this generation of African Americans were fragile, their employment more precarious. 
Black men would suffer disproportionately from continued discrimination and from the downturn in employ-
ment from the late 1970s onwards, and despite progress, African Americans continue to be overrepresented in 
the lower tranches of income distribution, and underrepresented in the highest (Katz et al., 2005). In the United 
States, inequality is not color blind.
3  | THE “GRE AT LE VELLING” IN GLOBAL PERSPEC TIVE
Our aim in putting forward these qualifications to Piketty's account of the era of Western social democracy— 
which he acknowledges was one of “incomplete equality”— is not to dismantle the argument put forward in Capital 
and Ideology. Rather, we are urging that Piketty's vision of the global reach of systems of inequality, his attention to 
politics, ideas, and conflict, are also brought to bear on the story of the last 75 years. In a book of admirable global 
scope, it is notable that the analysis of the postwar era remains mostly restricted to Western Europe and North 
America. Attending to the economic and social links that continue to structure colonial and postcolonial relations, 
much like attending to the racial and gendered exclusions of Western welfare states, helps us to think more criti-
cally about the less visible but important contributions that underwrite the successes of the postwar period.
Bringing in this wider focus means entertaining questions about the role of late colonialism in shaping both 
the European recovery, about the fate of new nations in the postcolonial era of development, and about the 
relationship between Western equality and global inequality. In this respect, Piketty's synthesis is limited by the 
questions not addressed by generations of scholars. The extent to which a re- energized postwar colonialism (or 
arrangements that built on the advantage of former colonial powers) contributed to the European “Golden Age” 
and made possible a reduction in inequality is a question that economic analyses— focused almost exclusively 
on a regional European perspective (taking at best a North Atlantic view)— seldom touch. It is unlikely that this 
relationship was a principal cause of the “economic miracle” of the postwar Western boom, but there is certainly 
room to ask whether they made it easier to achieve, and to what extent the “Golden Age” was gilded at the cost 
of the global south.
If, as we have seen the experience of the “Great Levelling” in Western Europe and North America sustained 
a number of hierarchies and exclusions internally, it must also be recognized that the world itself did not see 
such a levelling. Charting the trajectory of economic inequality within nations across the non- Western world 
is a difficult task, and the picture is complex. Yet, it is clear that between 1950 and 1980 the catch up between 
the Global South and North was in no way comparable to the compression of inequality experienced in Western 
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Europe and North America. And despite the end of Empires and colonialism, the gap between Global North and 
South continued to increase. According to Maddison's estimates, GDP growth per capita in Western Europe be-
tween 1950 and 1973 outpaced that of most other regions of the world, with the exception of Japan, extending 
the gap that had opened up over the previous century and a half (Maddison, 2006, p. 126). The West's share of 
global GDP decreased slightly after 1950, but if we take into account population growth (which was much faster 
in the global south), its inhabitants became even more affluent relative to everyone else (Maddison, 2006, p. 
127). Constructing precise measures of global and between- country distributions of wealth and income before 
1970 is not easy, but the evidence points to the fact that, at the very least, there was no global “great levelling” to 
match the decreases in inequality experienced in the richer parts of Western Europe and North America. (Anand 
& Segal, 2008; Bourguignon & Morrison, 2002; Williamson, 2015; van Zanden et al., 2014). The reasons for this 
are complex, but it is often forgotten that Europe's “Golden Age” coincided with the last decades of its imperial 
dominance over significant parts of the Global South. And nations which had not been colonized, or had been 
independent for longer, such as those of Latin America, were still integrated into a global system whose structures 
continued to advantage the “West.”
The independence of India in 1947 can occlude the revival of colonialism experienced in the post war period 
(Cooper, 2011). Much of British Africa did not become independent until the mid- 1960s. French dominion in 
Africa only unraveled from 1960 onwards, while the Portuguese colonies in Africa had to wait until the mid- 1970s 
(Jansen & Osterhammel, 2017). While they remained under the control of their colonial metropolises, colonized 
territories played an important part in supporting the reconstruction of European nations.
After the war, the pressing agenda was not decolonization, but further colonial development, an idea that 
generated significant consensus and was shared by European social democrats. Britain relied extensively on the 
support of its empire during the war, imposing controls on exports and production from its colonies and running 
extensive debts with its dominions, particularly India, which had to settle on a substantial write- down on the 
debt due to devaluation foregone interest, and other instruments (Abreu, 2017). As Cain and Hopkins note, “once 
elected, the [British] Labour Party hoisted the burdens of empire with all the enthusiasm of the converted, despite 
its long- proclaimed opposition to imperialism” (2016, p. 669). The loss of India in 1947 only focused the minds of 
Whitehall on seeking to avoid the same fate in other parts of the empire. This was aided by the creation of a cur-
rency union— the sterling area— which brought together current and former colonial territories and helped to ease 
the metropole's dollar gap. The restrictions it imposed on non- sterling imports benefited British producers, aiding 
the British economy as it transitioned to holding Europe as its main trading partner (Schenk, 1994, pp. 130– 131). 
In addition, by running a negative balance of trade with its colonies on favored terms, Britain was able to use its 
empire as a source of credit that gave it the head room for investment for reconstruction at home without the 
need for further deflation and austerity (Cain & Hopkins, 2016, p. 671).
Similar ambitions drove France's “second colonialism” and the Monnet Plan for 1948– 1952, a key plank of 
reconstruction and the ensuing boom, “downgraded concerns over the living standards of colonial peoples in an 
overarching demand for an escalation of colonial exports.” Like Britain, France restricted imports denominated in 
dollars to the colonies, directing them to metropolitan products (White, 2011, pp. 216– 217). For both Britain and 
France, such systems allowed the purchase of commodities, including food, at lower than market prices and the 
export of the goods produced by the metropole at higher rates (White, 2011, p. 229). The Netherlands lacked the 
resources of other colonial powers and could not stem the pro- independence tide in its possessions in Southeast 
Asia. Nevertheless, newly independent Indonesia had to agree to take on the debts of the colonial administra-
tion, and commit to allowing the free flow of profits from Dutch companies in its territory to the Netherlands 
(White, 2011, p. 230).
This renewed colonial impetus was couched in the language of welfare and development (Cooper & 
Packard, 1997; Midgley & Piachaud, 2012). Yet, Seen from the perspective of the colonized, for all the rhetoric 
of development and welfare, this “second colonialism” of the early postwar period failed to live up to its prom-
ises. However, our ability to know the extent to which late colonialism affected levels of growth or how it was 
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distributed is extremely limited— comparable data are seldom available before 1960, while statistics gathered by 
both colonial and postcolonial governments are unreliable on a variety of counts (Jerven, 2013). Nevertheless, 
whatever projects of colonial development were, they were not meant to deliver equality. In some cases, post-
war projects of colonial development also meant reforming the relationship between metropole and empire, but 
reform did not mean political or economic equalization. The French Union and the constitution of 1946 gave a 
degree of representation in a quasi- federal assembly to the population of the colonies, now renamed “territoires 
d'outre- mer” (overseas territories); yet while all were technically “citizens,” the status carried, “multiple, radically 
different, and wholly unequal sets of rights” (Shepard, 2011, p. 257). The population of the colonies greatly out-
numbered that of metropolitan France but elected only a fraction of Assembly representatives, and even there a 
proportion of the seats was reserved for the representative of “European” settlers in overseas territories (ibid.). 
British colonies never saw direct representation in the metropolitan parliament, but there was a move to grant 
self- rule status to colonial territories and allow local political parties to accede to power, as long as the legitimacy 
of Empire was not questioned. (Cooper, 2011, pp. 202– 203). Moreover, Portugal— where a fascist- inspired dicta-
torship held on to power— resisted attempts to renegotiate the colonial relationship, seeking instead to tighten 
control over its African possessions (Jerónimo & Costa Pinto, 2015).
Colonized populations seized on the unrealized promise of “welfare colonialism” and on the distance between 
the rhetoric of inclusion of imperial government and its reality, using this gap to mobilize waves of strikes and 
protests demanding equality (Cooper, 2011, p. 205). Soon these would develop into pro- independence move-
ments that further pushed France and Britain toward accepting the inevitability of decolonization. Only Portugal— 
Western Europe's poorest country— continued to see in the colonies the means to retain international influence 
and supporting metropolitan development. But the enormous military and economic effort required to preserve 
its presence in Africa in the face of powerful pro- independence movements would eventually bring down the 
dictatorship and Europe's last Empire in 1974 (MacQueen, 1997).
3.1 | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ITS INEQUITIES
While our focus has so far been on colonies and former colonies, the relationship between the west's “Golden 
Age” and the wider world went beyond it as a truly international systems was built. And again, it is legitimate to 
ask whether the affluence that permitted the construction of a more equal society in the global north came with 
costs for the south.
The United States emerged from the war as the unrivalled dominant economy, and as a result of its power, the 
institutions underpinning the international system were to a large extent built in its image. The Bretton Woods 
framework facilitated the use of dollar as lead reserve and exchange currency. This afforded the United States 
the “exorbitant privilege” of controlling the world's currency, which allowed it to run significant balance of trade 
deficits, and exerting a downward pressure on prices (and wages) in developing countries (Eichengreen, 2011). In 
addition to such privilege, the United States (and to a lesser degree the leading European economies) also enjoyed 
further advantages. A technological edge and accumulated wealth supported their position as leaders in capital 
and capital goods (including foreign direct investment), whose value exceeded the raw materials and food produce 
that made up the bulk of exports from the global south.
Piketty is well aware of the inequalities such asymmetries can generate, which Capital and Ideology dissects in 
relation to British and French foreign assets at the height of liberal imperialism between 1,880 and 1914, and in 
relation to the post- 1970 cycle of globalization (Piketty, 2020, pp. 283– 285; 693– 6969). For the earlier imperial 
period, Piketty rightly looks beyond “the invisible hand” of the market as the source of these inequalities, pointing 
to the politics and violence behind the construction of an international system built on colonialism (ibid, p. 284). 
When it comes to the last four decades, Piketty points the finger at the political choices protecting opaque capital 
flows and tax havens under the umbrella of the Washington consensus (Piketty, 2020, p. 695). In between these 
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two periods lies most of the 20th century, and particularly the “social democratic” era. Yet, this era was less of a 
hiatus in the construction of global inequality than Piketty's argument can lead us to believe, and there are import-
ant continuities that arguably contributed to reproducing, although in a much transformed way, the advantages 
created during the colonial era.
We can look specifically at three developments where the politics of the postwar international order created 
the conditions for the reproduction of the advantages of the “west,” contributing to its 30 glorious years. The first 
was the advent of the Cold War, a confrontation with global reach that molded international relations until the 
end of the century, and created a rationale for privileging economic power and strategic military alliances over 
addressing global inequalities. The second was the (re)creation of a constellation of international institutions that, 
while giving voice and platform to less powerful nations, was nonetheless skewed toward the interests of the 
great powers. And finally, while there were efforts and plans to combat poverty and what became termed “under-
development” on a worldwide scale, these were guided by approaches that reproduced the productivist ideology 
of the era and Western- centric ideal of modernization that had far reaching consequences.
The internationalist impetus that marked the end of the Second World War (which saw the creation of the 
United Nations, the WHO, or UNESCO, among other international organizations) extended to trade and, more 
broadly, to the ambition integrating newly independent nations in the world economy. Many hoped that the de-
cades ahead would also see rising living standards and a reduction in conflict across the world (Moyn, 2018). 
However, such ambitions struggled to materialize as visions of internationalism brought the interests of nations 
and blocs of extremely different power into conflict. One example of this was the fate of the International Trade 
Organization, initially envisaged as a key pillar of a new global order and one of the new agencies of the United 
Nations (Toye, 2003, p. 90). During the negotiations for its establishment in 1947 and 1948, “underdeveloped” 
nations such as India and Brazil— at times supported by some within the United States administration— attempted 
to create mechanisms allowing industrializing economies to introduce a degree of protection that buffered man-
ufacturing sectors from liberalized trade. The proposal put forward also would allow expropriation or nation-
alization of foreign- owned businesses in certain circumstances (Toye, 2003, p. 288). The aim was to even out 
some of the advantages that had accrued to the early industrializing economies as others caught up. There is no 
guarantee that, had it ever been instituted, the ITO would have of itself contributed to reducing global inequalities. 
Nevertheless, its stillbirth and the reasons behind it are themselves food for thought regarding the political and 
ideological nuances of the “age of equality.”
The British Labor government, creator of the Beveridgeian Welfare State, opposed many of the provisions of 
the ITO, particularly where they brought into question Britain's system of imperial preference. But a rear- guard 
action against the proposals came also from a different ideological quarter which was in the process of develop-
ing a response to the Keynesian worldview: neoliberals who, in Slobodian's words, pitched the “human rights of 
capital,” against the “human rights” of the social democratic internationalist agenda (2018, p. 125). The founding 
network of neoliberalism, the Mount Pèlerin Society, had an important supporter in the International Chamber of 
Commerce, and key members of the society lobbied on its behalf against the ITO proposals (ibid, pp. 128– 130). 
Their opposition to the ITO was based on the desire to protect the freedom of capital and security of property, 
from state intervention, capital controls, and attempts to manipulate markets and prices in the interest of full em-
ployment. The ITO never saw the light of day as the Truman administration decided to drop its support, opting to 
retain the interim agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT), which arguably was much more favorable to the leading 
industrial exporters (Toye, 2003). The neoliberal agenda did not (at this time) triumph on all fronts, but it contrib-
uted to the ITO debacle, and more widely to planting the flag for the interests of capital in competition with social 
democratic emphasis on (a greater degree of) equality.
The building of a new international order in the postwar period may have been done under the banner of uni-
versal human and social rights, expressed in de Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948. But these ideals had to compete with opposition from an emergent liberalism, the stric-
tures of Cold War objectives, and its own limitations. Despite the universalist and global concerns of many of the 
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architects of postwar internationalism, the primacy of the nation state privileged national solutions to questions 
of want and exclusion. Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist central to the setting of international development 
agendas in the 1950s and 1960s, advocated the idea of “welfare world” to address global inequalities, but admit-
ted this goal was impeded by the existence of the national institutions that had created the modern welfare state 
(Moyn, 2018, pp. 104– 107).
And, as the experts and planners who built the postwar “social- democratic” state turned their attention to 
poverty and development in the rest of the world, they often carried with them visions of universality and of the 
road to affluence that were too narrowly based on the West's experience, and failed to acknowledge the imbal-
ance of power between the “First” and the “Third” Worlds. The ideal of modernization, which in its various forms, 
guided the actions of new international agencies, great power governments, and development actors through 
the postwar era was based on a distinction between “modern” and “traditional” societies. “Modern” societies— 
those of North America and the wealthier parts of Europe— were seen to have overcome the burdens of custom, 
tradition, and particularism through an embrace of the values of progress, rationalism, and technologically driven 
progress. These were said to be the foundations of the economic transformation that made the “First World,” 
delivering stability and affluence.
This should not be taken to mean that many Western modernizers were not concerned with poverty and 
inequality— these were central to the ambitions of the reinvented international agencies. Yet, not only was the 
blueprint of a better society a Western- centric one, but even the concern with poverty and inequality expressed 
in development agendas of the 1940s and 1950s would soon be displaced by a much narrower focus on growth 
and modernization (Alacevich, 2011). Addressing “underdevelopment,” as President Truman announced in his 
1949 Point Four Speech setting the United States global aid program, was increasingly framed in terms of defin-
ing a sphere of influence that would contain the Soviet challenge (Lorenzini, 2019, p. 26). As was the case in the 
reconstruction of Europe, it was hoped that growth would provide the means to ease class conflict without asking 
too many difficult questions about distribution (Maier, 1997, pp. 622– 623).
The creation of the modernization consensus was not the work of a single national actor, it appeared in dif-
ferent guises and neither was it exclusively Western driven— the Soviet Union provided its own model of rapid 
industrialization— but the supposed lessons of the Western experience were the building blocs of development 
agendas of international organizations (Engerman & Unger, 2009; Gilman, 2007). Development was to be deliv-
ered through tools which had successfully allowed United States and European liberals to tackle the effects of 
the Great Depression and mobilize their economies for the war. The mixed economy recipe that seemed to have 
worked at home to provide stability and, increasingly, affluence was packaged as set of policies that would deliver 
growth.
The contemporary vision of the history of Western growth, itself helped to minimize the question of inequal-
ity. Simon Kuznets pioneering work on the history of income distribution seemed to suggest that growing inequal-
ity was a side effect of the introduction of new technologies and production processes, and would be evened out 
in the long run as the benefits of increased productivity spread across the population. Despite Kuznets’ own ca-
veats, his “curve” supported the belief that modernization would, naturally and in good time, address the question 
of inequality. In the immediate future, producing growth would take priority (Kuznets, 1955).
The ideal path of modernization suggested to, or even imposed on, “underdeveloped countries” (and which had 
both its capitalist and socialist versions) was based on the same narrow definitions of productive labor and invest-
ment that shaped the building of social market economy in the postwar West. Enduring North– South inequalities 
did not go unchallenged by economists and political leaders in the “Third World.” Yet, even as they denounced an 
unjust international order that tipped the scales in favor of the North, such criticisms tended to follow the tracks 
laid down by stadialist modernization theories. South American “structuralists,” led by Raúl Prebisch— Argentine 
economist and Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL)— denounced the 
international system of “unequal trade,” but still called for capital intensive import substitution industrialization 
as the solution (Love, 2018).
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Despite differences across its various modes— socialist, capitalist, or dependentista— modernization- led devel-
opment echoed the assumptions and exclusions that characterized Western liberal modernization. It is true that, 
especially in in the early postwar years, there were high ambitions. Yet, quite often social provision was created 
(or simply continued the practice of the colonial state) as a tool and level of modernization, protecting cherished 
“modern” industries or as a disciplinary tool to modernize the “backward” and “traditional” backwaters, resulting 
in welfare provision that was universal in name but highly differentiated in reality (Ferguson, 2015, pp. 71– 73).
In India for instance, the Nehruvian government attempted a vast overhaul and expansion of public educa-
tion. However, such schemes fell far short of what was required for universal provision, leaving local communi-
ties largely alone to manage educational funding and available government support. As historian Taylor Sherman 
(2018) shows, the decentralized and underfunded educational schemes of the Nehruvian era exacerbated inequal-
ities, making it harder for politically and socially disadvantages communities and regions to access government 
education. The period between 1951 and 1953 also witnessed major reforms in South Africa, during which edu-
cation moved from private providers into the state sector. At exactly the same time, the rise of new apartheid era 
divisions strictly separated educational institutions according to race and ethnicity, and allowed only White South 
Africans access to advanced technical and vocational training. Funding was highly unequal across the primary sec-
tor, and the system was not reformed until the 1980s (Kallaway, 2002, p. 2). And in Brazil, the country's extreme 
patterns of racial and social class segregation mapped directly onto unequal provisions of key social services in-
cluding education and healthcare (Hernandez, 2004). While powerful labor groups in the 1950s played a key role 
in shaping the state provisions and welfare benefits (Colistete, 2007) such negotiations ignored the role of vast 
numbers of workers in the informal and less- organized sectors of the economy.
Many of these differences are the compounding consequences of centuries of racist and casteist divisions 
and discrimination, and Piketty's book does a good job of outlining these long historical links. Yet, such ongoing 
forms of exclusion were also the products of an uncritical mid- 20th century “universalism,” which included people 
on grounds that drew sharp distinctions between workers and dependents, the West and the non- West, modern 
economies and rural ones.
Where welfare interventions reached beyond the protection of the “modern” worker, it tended to do so with 
the overt aim of modernizing the “backward,” bringing with it highly gendered productivist dreams of modernity. 
The African socialist governments of newly independent Zambia and Tanzania studied by Priya Lal saw women 
and the domestic sphere as the conduits for supporting better nourishment and children's educational enrollment, 
while at the same time undervaluing women's role in other forms of labor, including agricultural work (Lal, 2018, 
pp. 186– 190). This vision of a gendered division of labor was also present in the agendas of international orga-
nizations such as UNESCO, who looked to catalyzing the “natural roles” of women for modernization (Peppin 
Vaughan, 2010, p. 408).
Many governments in the developing and postcolonial nations embraced the capital- intensive route to mo-
dernity, delaying fighting poverty domestically until such time as when the proceeds of growth would make dis-
tribution easier. Eye- wateringly large loans were contracted from international institutions or the capital markets 
of New York and London. But the hopes pinned on industrialization did not materialize. Export- led industrializa-
tion failed to generate the kinds of generalized industrial employment that had characterized the experience of 
the Global North (Benanav, 2019, p. 9). By drawing strict dividing lines between an “informal,” “traditional,” and 
“backward” world and an ideal of high modernity, postwar development agendas and institutions contributed to 
generating increasing inequalities within developing countries without bridging the widening gap in national out-
put between them and the “west.”
As a result, by the late 1960s, there was an increasing recognition that the Western- derived model of mod-
ernization had failed. From the 1955 Bandung conference, the nations of the global south increasingly sought a 
collective voice to challenge what they saw as the inequities of the global system. In 1974 this was articulated by 
New International Economic Order declaration at the United Nations General Assembly, which denounced the 
“widening gap between the developed and developing countries,” resulting from “vestiges of alien and colonial 
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domination (…) and neo- colonialism”; demanded “just prices” for the production of developing nations; uncondi-
tional assistance; and technology transfers (Gilman, 2015; United Nations, 1974).
Nonetheless, by this point the Western social democratic model that had produced the “Great Levelling” was 
itself entering a period of crisis which can arguably related to the shifting relationship between the global north 
and south, of which the NIEO but also the OPEC’s flexing of muscle that generated the oil shock of 1973 are symp-
toms. On one level the export- led industrial model of the United States and Western Europe was reaching its own 
limits, and for the first time in many decades encountering exporting competitors— particularly Japan and other 
Asian “Tiger Economies.” But at other levels, the sense of crisis afflicting the West also had its roots in its unequal 
relationship with the rest of the world, as well in its own internal exclusions and inequalities.
A growing awareness and politicization of inequalities at home and abroad combined to animate a growing 
cycle of protest that spread across North America and Western Europe through the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Inspired by anti- colonial activists such as Gandhi, the Civil Rights movement challenged the United States to 
address the deep racial inequalities that endured a century after the abolition of slavery. In cities and campuses 
across the west, a new generation was turned on to the inequities of the global system through movements of op-
position to colonial and postcolonial military conflicts: France's brutal war in Algeria, the U.S.’s war in Vietnam, as 
well as many other conflicts that produced anti- imperialist role models. A swathe of recent scholarship has high-
lighted the important role played by the “Third World,” directly and indirectly, in shaking the legitimacy of postwar 
Western order (Kalter, 2016; Slobodian, 2018). Denouncing the hypocrisy of democracies who engaged in Cold 
War driven “imperialist” wars went hand in hand with attacking what were seen as the limits, exclusion and in-
equalities of liberal democracy at home. Second wave feminism highlighted and fought the patriarchal paternalism 
of the postwar order; radical activists looked to mobilize migrant workers to shake comfortable “old left” unions 
into facing the predicament of those outside the embrace of the welfare state; while police brutality, paternalist 
politics, and censorship all came under attack. And soon, as global competition and the deceleration of the global 
economy saw the beginnings of deindustrialization, serious industrial conflict returned.
In 1975 the Trilateral Commission, a group of leading experts and government advisors, warned that (Western) 
democracy faced a crisis of governability. Their report joined a number of other pessimistic forecasts— including 
the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth— about the state of the world, and the viability of the political, social, and eco-
nomic system built since 1945. As many commentators have pointed out, this sense of generalized crisis engulfing 
the “West” was essential in creating the conditions for a shift in modes of thinking about the economy, the role of 
the state, and the place of welfare (Leimgruber, 2013).
4  | CONCLUSION
The rise of new social movements in the 1970s, global struggles against racial exclusions, and Second Wave 
feminism all point our attention to the limits of inclusion within postwar welfare states. They expose not only 
the inadequacy of these regimes for fighting long- entrenched historical exclusions, founded on older prejudices 
around race, gender, or caste, but also the new barriers to inclusion, created by “productivist” regimes that make 
visible and value certain contributions and subject positions, while making others harder to see. The upheavals 
of the late 1960s and 1970s should be read in this context, as indictments of postwar welfarism, as well as earlier 
inequality regimes. In that context, we have to attend to the rise of neoliberalism and the resurgence of income 
inequality cautiously, making some room for the complicated way in which neoliberal regimes went hand in hand 
with expanding civil and political rights for women, racial minorities, and gay and transsexual people. We say this 
not to valorize “recognition” over “redistribution” (Fraser, 1995) or to minimize the concerns that Piketty draws 
attention to, including the rise of the 1%, but to also to highlight areas of inequality that Capital and Ideology leaves 
unexplored.
66  |     PAIDIPATY AnD RAMOS- PInTO
Rather we want to return to the argument that mid- century welfare states were, as systems of inclusion, also 
systems of exclusion. If postwar social democracies failed to prevent the re- emergence of wealth inequality, this 
was not simply because they lacked ambition and scope, but rather these failures were also due to the very terms 
by which people (as men, women, citizens, migrants, workers, dependents, taxpayers, and others) were seen and 
incorporated into the provisions of these “inequality regimes.” While Piketty's hope and optimism around contem-
porary inequalities is admirable, it is necessary, if we really are to tackle rising disparities around the globe, that 
we are attentive to and redress the terms of which public provisions and government schemes view and include 
large categories of people, including migrants, women, care laborers and those in the informal sectors. At the same 
time, it is important to couch within- country inequalities in a broader global structure, paying attention to global 
governance, debt obligations, supply chain inequalities, and unfair terms of trade.
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